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ii.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred u$on this court
pursuant to Rule 3(a) Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals this being an appeal from a final Order of
the Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake Cii^y Department,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Plaintiff/Appelant, a Utah ^eal estate
company, filed this action to recover a real estate
commission from defendants/respondentd based upon a
listing agreement entered into by the parties on
May 19, 1986.

Plaintiff/Appellant will be referred

to hereinafter as either Realty World or as Agent and
defendants/respondents hereinafter as Marsdens or
Sellers.
Marsdens answered and filed |a Third-Party
Complaint against Realty World's Agent Thomas E.
Eveleth.

Marsdens alleged the listingl agreement

was not the final agreement between the parties and
that Realty World and Eveleth had committed fraud in
inducing Marsdens to execute the listing agreement.
Said listing agreement is attached in the Addendum
to this Brief as Exhibit "Aff and is alfeo found as
Exhibit "A" to plaintiff!s complaint.
On June 12, 1987 the Circuit Court held a
-1-

Hearing to decide if parol evidence would be allowed
at the jury trial June 18, 1987.

The court after

reviewing the memorandum of the parties and hearing
the arguments of counsel issued the Order allowing
Parol Evidence to be used at trial.

A copy of said

Order being found in the Addendum as Exhibit "B".
Following the closing of the evidence on June 15,
1987, pursuant to Motions by Plaintiff and defendants
for directed verdicts the court dismissed plaintiff's
claims against defendants for fraud and punitive
damages and defendant's claims against third-party
defendant for fraud and punitive damages.
The Jury returned with a verdict of no cause
of action as to plaintiff's complaint and awarded
defendants their attorney's fees.

The Jury found

there was mutual mistake between the parties and
that no agreement had been formed.

Plaintiff filed

a Motion for a New Trial or to Amend the Judgment
alleging that the jury erred in finding that there
was no agreement between the parties and then
awarding attorney's fees based upon that agreement,
that one of the jurors lived in the same housing
complex as the Marsdens and Eveleth and that one
of the defendants' witnesses had offered false
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testimony.

The court struck from the Judament the

jury's award of attorney's fees to defendants, denied
the other portions of plaintiff's Motion and awarded
defendants their costs of $247,05.

Plaintiff

appeals from the lower court's allowance of the
introduction of parol evidence and its denial of
Plaintifffs Motion for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(1)

Did the trial court err in allowing

parol evidence to be heard,

(2)

Were the proceed

ings tainted by a juror hearing the case who lived
in the same condominium complex as defendants and
third-party defendant and by false testimony from
one of defendants1 witnesses.
STATUTES AND RULES
Section 25-5-1 and 25-5-4 U.C.A.

See Addendum.

Rule 9(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:

In all

averements of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity.

Malice, intent, knowledge and other

condition of a person may be averred generally,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sought in its action filed in
the Circuit Court to recover a real estate commission
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from defendants based upon the home that defendants
had listed with plaintiff being sold.

The parties

entered into a listing agreement on May 19, 1986
(Exhibit "A" Addendum).

The agreement exempted

four names from the transaction*

Marius Nelson,

Gene Brown, Robert Harper and Lamont Robinson.

The

term of the agreement was from May 19, 1986 through
July 19, 1986.
On June 16, 1986, Marsdens received
$1,000.00 from Paul Stevens and entered into a
written option to purchase agreement.

After siqn-

ing the agreement with Stevens, James Marsden
prepared a letter asking plaintiff to remove its
listing of the property (Exhibit "B" to plaintiff's
complaint).

On or about June 28, 1986, Marsdens

entered into a new listing agreement with Realty
World

(Exhibit "C" to plaintiff's complaint).

In

this document Marsdens exempted Paul Stevens as an
individual they would not have to paty a commission
on if the home was leased or sold to said person.
On June 29, 1986, Marsdens prepared a letter to
Realty World indicating that the home had been sold
to Mr. Stevens (Exhibit "D" to plaintiff's complaint).
On July 15, 1986 Mr. Stevens qave Marsdens an
additional $40,000.00 and on August 25, 1986 Stevens
and Marsdens closed the sale and purchase of the

real estate.
Plaintiff discovered the Ma^sden-Stevens
transaction had occurred and filed action to recover its commission based upon the listing agreement
entered into on May 19, 1986 (Exhibit "A" in addendum)
alleging that during the term of the Agreement a buyer
had been found namely Paul Stevens.

defendants alleged

that they had a verbal agreement with Realty World's
agent Thomas E. Eveleth that if they ^old the home
themselves that no commission would result.

Defendants

alleged that by now seeking a commission Eveleth was
attempting a fraud upon Marsdens.

Re4lty World alleged

that Marsden by keeping the information from Realty World
that $1,000.00 had been delivered to Marsdens by Stevens
was liable to plaintiff for damages irj fraud as well
as plaintiff's commission.
On June 12, 1987, three days prior to the
jury trial the parties argued before the Honorable
Phillip K. Palmer, Circuit Court Judge the issue of
whether or not defendants should be allowed to introduce
parol evidence to vary the terms of the written listing
agreement at time of trial.

Counsel submitted briefs

with no supporting affidavits and argued the matter
before the court.

The court issued itls Order allowing

the admission of parol evidence (Exhibit "B" in addendum),
-5-

At the time for seating of the jury one female juror
stated that she lived in the same complex as the
Marsdens and Eveleth and was excused by Judge Palmer.
Evidence was presented and followincr both parties
resting the court upon motion dismissed plaintiff!s
claims for fraud and punitive damages against defendants
and defendants1 claims for fraud against third-party
defendant Eveleth.

The Jury found that there was

mutual mistake between the parties that the agreement
between them was void found no cause of action for
plaintiff and awarded defendants their attorney's fees.
Subsequent to trial it was ascertained that
juror Lee Verl Conder lived in the same condominium
complex as Marsdens and Eveleth.

Plaintiff filed a

Motion for a New Trial based upon the jury's improper
award of attorney's fees and irregularity in the proceedings due to the jury problem and false testimony
by defendants' witness Rita Luke.

The trial judqe

deleted from the jury's verdict the award of attorney's
fees to defendants and denied the other portions of
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial or to Amend Judgment
(Order

dated July 16, 1987).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Our Supreme Court ruled on a similar listinq
-6-

agreement to the one in this case and find it to be
clear and unambiguous and did not allow parol evidence
to be introduced.

There was error in law in allowing

such evidence to be introduced to the jury.
The mere naked allegation of fraud cannot
be used as was done in this case to defeat the purpose
of the parol evidence to-wit to maintain the sanctity
of the written agreement.
Where a large potential pool of jurors exists
there was prejudice and irregularity in the proceedings
where one of the jurors lived in the $ame condominium
complex as the defendants and third-p^rty defendant.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IVf ALLOWING PAROL

EVIDENCE
In E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency Inc. v.
Broderick (522 P. 2nd 144, Utah 1974) d>ur Supreme Court
was asked to analyze a contract almosii identical in
language to the one before this court J

The question

presented to the court was whether a dlear and unambiguous
term of a written contract can be varijed by parol evidence,
The person in the shoes of the Marsdens in that case,
Broderick, claimed that there was a verbal aqreement
that a commission of 6% would result only if the real
-7-

estate company sold the subject home.

This is similar

to the position being taken by Marsdens in this case.
The court analyzed the contract and found
it to be clear, definite and unambiguous and that
parol evidence may not be taken to vary the terms of
such a document and reversed the trial court that had
allowed the parol evidence admitted.
The court reasoned that without holding to
this rule there would be no assurance of the enforceability of a written contract and a party would be
left to the mercy of uncertainties o^ oral testimony.
The same contract language that plaintiff uses to
justify an award of a commission is the same language
that our Supreme Court found to be clear and unambiguous.
Marsdens attempt to point to a line on the listing
agreement that says 3 names reserved and say that that
line is unclear and thus parol evidence is necessary.
Again in the Strout case (cited above) the court faced
that issue wherein the Sellers claimed that some blanks
had been left out.

The court pointed out that there

was no question as to the portion of the contract
dealing with commissions and that such should not be
a door-opening device to allow parol evidence in.
Our legislature in the area of real estate
has recognized the great dangers of mixing in alleged
-8-

verbal agreements and has required relal estate brokers
to put their agreements into writing if they expect
to be paid for their work (see Sections 25-5-1 and
25-5-4 U.C.A. in addendum).

Every real estate trans-

action will have discussion before documents are signed.
However to force a court to go through lengthy testimony
on conversations before a clear agreement is signed
would be both time consuming, against public policy
and turn most cases involving real estate contracts
into swearing matches.
Here where the form was a ohe-page agreement
executed in form not once but twice by Marsdens, in
the area of real estate, a great respect should be given
to the sanctity of the written agreement.

In this case

the jury by hearing parol evidence received the opposite
impression that being that it was more important what
was said before a contract was signed than the contract
itself.

The introduction of such testimony was highly

prejudicial to plaintiff and created the impression that
although documents were signed they hqive little if any
legal effect.
Marsdens have attempted to det around the
Strout case by citing the Union Bank y. Swenson case,
707 P.2nd. 663 (Utah 1985) as holding that where there
is fraud, contemporaneous conversations and statements
-9-

regarding the contract must be introduced.

In Union

Bank the defendants signed promissory notes in an
individual capacity.

When default occurred and the

bank sued, Swensons in affidavits alleged that the
bank had told them that the individual signatures
were for appearances only and would not be used for
collection purposes.

The trial court applied the

parol evidence rule and granted Summary Judgment for
the Bank.
The court stated that there is a rebuttable
presumption that a writing which on its face appears
to be an integrated agreement is what it appears to be.
However in this case the court found that there was
enough of a question of a material fact revolvinq around
the fraud issue that summary judgment was not proper.
The court said parol evidence rule does have an exception where fraud is involved*
The question to be asked however, is there
any parol evidence rule left where a party can simply
allege fraud, have the jury hear all its parol evidence
and then have the court discover that there really was
no fraud.

By that time all the damage has been done

and it is impossible for a jury to forget what it
has heard.
-10-

A review of the pleadings oh file reveal
that is what happened in this case.

Marsdens' Answer

and Third-Party complaint use the words fraud.

However,

there is not one date or circumstance cited to meet
the requirement of Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure that circumstances constituting fraud shall
be stated with particularity (see also Heathman v Hatch,
372 P.2nd 990 (Utah 1962) that mere u^e of the term
fraud does not meet the requirements of this rule).
Nor was any affidavit submitted by the Marsdens submitted
to the court before the June 12, 1986 parol evidence
hearing to give the court any circumstances surrounding
fraud.

The lower court allowed the jjjury to hear parol

evidence based simply upon a naked alf[Legation in defendants1 pleadings that there was fraud.

Defendants rested

upon the allegations in their pleadinfcrs and unlike the
Swenson case there was no sworn statement that would give
the court some reason to allow parol Evidence in.

The

parol evidence rule would be rendered meaningless if as
in this case any allegation of fraud pould be made and
the door opened to parol evidence.

This case was a

classic example of the harm that can occur.

After the

evidence was presented the trial judge determined as a
matter of law that there had been no fraud.

However,

the damage had been done as far as th^ jury was concerned.
-11-

The court in Union Bank was surely saying that a court
before allowing parol evidence it must make more of
an inquiry than simply saying you have plead fraud, we
will not let the jury hear parol evidence.
It is also to be noted that the Union Bank
case cites language from the Strout case that parol
evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict clear and
unambiguous terms of an integrated contract.

In Union

Bank the court states that "Fraud" must be fleshed out
by elaboration and consideration.

This was not done in

this case before the jury was allowed to hear that
evidence.
II.

IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS (JURY)

At the time the jury was selected juror Sue
Morris was excused for cause it being made known to the
court that she lived in the same complex as the defendants and third-party defendant.

Despite this situation

occuring, juror Lee Verl Conder kept quiet that he also
lived in the same complex as the defendants and thirdparty defendant and was seated as one of the four jurors.
Although counsel cannot go into the mind of that juror
it would appear to be an irregularity in the proceedings
where the court excuses one juror for cause and through
the silence of another juror that man is seated on the
panel.

In a large city with a large jury pool, plaintiff
-12-

deserves to have a jury seated that is free of such
a situation.

The failure of this juror to speak up

was unnecessary and goes to his state| of mind to hear
the case.

Plaintiff would have used |a challenge if

such a fact had been disclosed to him|.

(See Jenkins

v. Parrish 627 P.2nd 533 (Utah 1981) that this is
prejudical error).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks a| new trial wherein
parol evidence that would vary the cljear terms of a
contract is not admitted and is not used to confuse a
jury into thinking that instead of th[e written agreement
being most vital, pre-contract negotiations play the
largest role.

Plaintiff/Appellant farther seeks a new

trial on the grounds that defendants/respondents were
allowed simply to state the word fraud in their pleadings,
not state it with particularity, file no supporting
affidavits and have the judge allow them to offer parol
evidence based upon their naked allegations of fraud.
Plaintiff also seeks a new trial where all jurors have
fairly disclosed their situation to the trial judge.
Respectfully submitted thi^ 4th day of December,
1987.

JAMES H. DEANS
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
-13-

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing together with Addendum
to Paul M. Belnap, attorney for Defendants/Respondents
at Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this 4th day of December, 1987.

ii
JAMES H. DEANS
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

SALES AGENCY CONTRACT

FORM A

(Exciusive|RightToSe!I)
Member of Multiple Listing S erviise of Salt Lane Board of REALTORS®
1. In consideration of your agreement to list the property described on form E and to use
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser or tenant therefor, I hereby grant you for the period stated
herein, from date hereof, the exclusive right tp sell, lease or exchange said property or any Dart
thereof, at the price and terms stated herein, or at such other price or terms to which I may agree in
writing.
2. During the iife o* this contract. i f you f-nl: £ cany wno is ready, able and willing to zjy. ;=ase
or exchange saic property c any par: t r e ' e c :
se'd pnee and terms, or any cthe r price c- '~rr~.i. -c
whicn i may agree ir writing, or i' saic pr-{
> or any part thereof is sold, leased or er.zr.zr.zez
during said term by mvself or any other party
gree to pay tne broker listed below a commission of
£
"m
nr L^
q-x of sucn saie. lease1 or exchange price which commission umess otner£
wise agreed in writing, shall be due and payab on the cate of closing the sale, lease or exchance.
Should said property be sold, leased or exchan ged w i t h i n .
. months after such expiration to
any party to whom the property was offered or shown by me. or you. or any other party during the
term of this listing, I agree to pay you the commission above stated if I am not ooligatec to pay a
commission on such sale, lease or exchange tb ianother broker pursuant to another saies agency
contract entered into after the expiration date of this contract.
3. You are hereby authorized to accept a deposit as earnest money from any potential buyer on
the property as described on the property descr|pt ion and informational form (form B). Said deposit
to be held in a trust account.
4. I hereby warrant the information contaf ned on the property description and informational
form (form B) to be correct and that I have mar rjetabie title or an otherwise establishea ngnt to sell.
lease or exchange said property, except as
a. I agree to execute the necessary .documents of
conveyance or lease and to prorate genera! ta| xes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses
affecting said property to agreed date of posse:•as ion and to furnish a good and marketable title witn
abstract to aate or at my option a policy of title i hsurance in the amount of the purchase price ana in
the name of the purchaser. In the event of sale o r lease of other than real property. I agree to provide
proper conveyance and acceptable evidence of title or right to sell, lease or exchange.
5. In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement. I
agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee and allckosts of collection,
6. You are hereby authorized to obtain fina|ncial information from any mortgagee or other party
holding a lien or interest on this property.
7. You are hereby authorized and instructed to offer this property through the Multiple Listing
Service of the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS®
8. You are hereby authorized to place an appropriate sign on said property,
9. This Sales Agency Contract may not bephanged, modified or altered except by prior written
consent executed by the Principal Broker andithfe owner(s) shown below, except that the listed price
shall be changed by written reauest received1 from the owner(s).
The parties hereto agree not to discriminate ag ainst any person or persons based on race, color.
religion, sex or national origin in connection w th the sale, lease or exchange of properties under
this agreement. ^
fi/gcPKi-S
/<L<
LISTED PROPERTY

^>*

/ £ 2 ^ /z,

fr kr^^p &x

L'T~ L « K

is r " A /•+

(City)

LISTED PRICE.

(State)

/ b~ "7 S~& &

This contract is entered into this
This contract expires on thp
^ ^ ^

/
/ f

/

day of

day of

Listing Company

Pnrj&pal bvx&r (Instn Name)

BY\ ^

^

J& A H
<\t\s'>
/v" "T7 "A/ ""* //

. , IP

OwnerTSlOnature)
Owner^Spnature) /

*j~

,-

Owner (Signature)

Autnor«ifi£j^rgeynT(S'Ignaiure;i

I hereby acknowledge receipt of completed ;opies of this document (Form A) and the property
description and information form (Form 3).

V.!//sl-?.*K,,Complete CO'.n Form A'ard Form E.
1 espy to o*ne' — 1 fopv.ro listing effir.

EXHIBIT "A"

S.L.c r. ^v.sec 9 ' 8-

Paul M. Belnap, 0279
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
REALTY WORLD STONEBROOK,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'S MOTION
TO ADMIT PAROLE EVIDENCE

vs.
JAMES L. MARSDEN and
DONNA R. MARSDEN,

Cpivil No.

873000185-CV

Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
THOMAS E. EVELETH,
Third-Party Defendant.
The above entitled matter came before the court on the defendants'
motion to admit parole evidence on the 12th day of June, 1987 at the
hour of 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Phillip IC. Palmer with counsel
for the plaintiff appearing and counsel for the defendants appearing.
The Court having reviewed the memorandum, depositions and exhibits submitted by counsel, and having heard the arguments of counsel, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, t|iat the defendant's
motion to admit parole evidence is granted, and the court specifically
finds that the contracts in question and whibh are relied upon by
the plaintiff are ambiguous and not integrat[(ed agreements.

Fvliihif

"R»

DATED this

day of July, 1987.
BY THE COlJRT

By _ _ _ ^
Circuit Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICAT

f

I hereby certify that I mailed a tr^ie and correct copy
of the foregoing to the following, postajge prepaid on this
)3r

day of July, 1987.
Mr. James K. Deans
Attorney for Plaintiff
175 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

By
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